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Abstract 
The Eurozone’s reaction to the economic crisis beginning in late 2008 involved both efforts to 
mitigate the arbitrarily destructive effects of markets and vigorous pursuit of policies aimed 
at austerity and deflation. To explain this paradoxical outcome, this paper builds on Karl 
Polanyi’s account of how politics reached a similar deadlock in the 1930s. Polanyi argued that 
democratic impulses pushed for the protective response to malfunctioning markets. 
However, under the gold standard the prospect of currency panic afforded great political 
influence to bankers, who used it to push for austerity, deflationary policies, and the political 
marginalization of labor. Only with the achievement of this last would bankers and their 
political allies countenance surrendering the gold standard. The paper reconstructs Polanyi’s 
theory of “governing by panic” and uses it to explain the course of the Eurozone policy over 
three key episodes in the course of 2010-2012. The prospect of panic on sovereign debt 
markets served as a political weapon capable of limiting a protective response, wielded in 
this case by the European Central Bank (ECB). Committed to the neoliberal “Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus,” the ECB used the threat of staying idle during panic episodes to push 
policies and institutional changes promoting austerity and deflation. Germany’s 
Ordoliberalism, and its weight in European affairs, contributed to the credibility of this 
threat. While in September 2012 the ECB did accept a lender-of-last-resort role for sovereign 
debt, it did so only after successfully promoting institutional changes that severely 
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The manifold efforts made by Eurozone leaders to deal with the aftermath of 
the world financial crisis that began in 2007-2008 displayed a fundamental, 
and quite puzzling, contradiction. On the one hand, both the Eurozone as a 
whole and individual European states sought to prevent the transformation of 
crisis into catastrophe by evading the onset of well-known vicious circles. To 
combat bank runs and the downward spiral of debt deflation, governments 
offered deposit guarantees and bailouts, while the European Central Bank 
(ECB) provided liquidity to the financial sector on an unprecedented scale.1 
To avoid a fall in consumer prices that would reduce incentives to spend and 
and thus put further downward pressure on prices, the ECB sought to cut 
market interest rates and increase the money supply. Against the tendency of 
recession to breed more recession as spending and investment retrench in 
reaction to reduced demand, governments deployed expanded spending on 
unemployment support and other automatic stabilizers and—in 2009, at 
least—explicit demand stimulus. Later, Eurozone leaders did not simply 
stand aside in the face of an accelerating feedback loop between falling bond 
prices, higher government interest costs, and the prospects for budget 
balance. Instead, they worked to ease financing constraints for affected 
                                                        
1 In a "debt deflation," debtors liquidate assets to cover their debts; this drives asset prices down 
and tightens credit availability for other debtors, who must then liquidate their assets, etc. Fisher 
1933. 
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national governments. In short, national and international policy responses to 
the Eurozone crisis were replete with measures premised on the belief that it 
would be too costly to allow assets to find their own price on markets where 
pessimistic expectations could feed on themselves. 
 
On the other hand, accompanying this impulse to reject the sovereignty of the 
price mechanism and to build bulwarks against price collapses was a 
contradictory impulse—one that sought to enforce the sovereignty of the price 
mechanism and dismantle bulwarks against deflation. Above all, a number of 
governments, pushed by the ECB and other European institutions, made 
efforts to fight high levels of unemployment through promoting declines in 
wages—for instance, by reducing minimum wage rates, by decreasing public 
sector salaries, by reducing unemployment benefits, by weakening and 
decentralizing collective bargaining, and by forcing renegotiation of labor 
contracts in recessionary conditions.2 Meanwhile, fiscal demand stimulus that 
would have moderated downward pressure on wages and other prices was 
short-lived, and from 2010 states across Europe pursued austerity, seeking to 
balance budgets through tax rises and spending cuts. Eurozone members also 
adopted new treaty obligations intended to make austerity in reaction to 
budget difficulties effectively mandatory. 
 
Thus, Eurozone governments and institutions pursued policies designed at 
once to protect societies from markets and to subject them more fully to them. 
They used both fiscal and monetary policy instruments to ward off vicious 
circles of declining growth or financial implosion, yet did not turn these same 
instruments to promoting virtuous circles of expansion. Rather than a 
comprehensive victory for the point of view that prices cannot safely be left to 
                                                        
2 OECD 2014; Sapir et al. 2014. 
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find their own level, or for the rival claim that maximal price flexibility 
assures rapid adjustment and resumption of growth, one finds a deadlock 
between contradictory impulses. 
 
To explain this stalemate is the purpose of this paper. My explanation builds 
on Karl Polanyi's 1944 masterwork The Great Transformation, henceforth 
TGT. Polanyi traced the interwar European catastrophe to a similar deadlock, 
one which likewise kept the widely shared impulse to protect the social fabric 
against arbitrarily destructive markets from growing into a successful 
recovery program. Key to this deadlock was the shadow of financial panic, 
used by bankers to keep democratic politicians in check. As Polanyi wrote, 
 
Under the gold standard the leaders of the financial market are 
entrusted, in the nature of things, with the safeguarding of stable 
exchanges and sound internal credit on which government finance 
largely depends. The banking organization is thus in the position to 
obstruct any domestic move in the economic sphere which it happens 
to dislike, whether its reasons are good or bad. In terms of politics, on 
currency and credit, governments must take the advice of the bankers, 
who alone can know whether any financial measure would or would 
not endanger the capital market and the exchanges. … The financial 
market governs by panic.3 
 
On Polanyi's argument, the gold standard endured as long as it did, despite 
the tremendous difficulties it entailed, because financial interests feared the 
political consequences of unorthodox policy by labor governments and 
wished to retain the capacity to govern by panic. The end of the gold 
                                                        
3 Polanyi 1957, 229. 
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standard, by making a currency panic impossible, meant "the political 
dispossession of Wall Street." No longer constrained to heed the counsel of 
bankers, governments could launch innovative attacks on economic crisis, as 
the United States did in the New Deal. However, FDR's unilateral decision to 
take the dollar off gold was exceptional. Elsewhere, financial leaders retained 
their veto, and would only agree to abandon the gold standard when labor 
had been politically neutralized.4 
 
When a particular gold-backed currency was under threat, Polanyi notes, 
finance used the prospect of panic to push for austerity and deflation as 
solutions. These were intended achieve the adjustment of international 
relative prices, restoring competitiveness and ending the drain of gold that 
threatened convertibility. However, these efforts came up against Polanyi's 
famous "countermovement," animated by "the principle of social protection 
aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive 
organization."5 Workers resisted decreases in wages, agriculturalists decreases 
in food prices, and enterprises the destructiveness of a general deflation. 
"Authoritarian interventionism" in service of "vain deflationary efforts" 
weakened democracy but did not achieve its aim.6 What efforts there were to 
abandon the deflationary ambition and embrace deficit spending—as in the 
1936 "Blum experiment" in France—were doomed to frustration as long as the 
gold standard was in place.7 The result was a deadlock between the popular 
principle of social protection and the wish of financial interests to maintain 
political leverage. Economically, this led to an incoherent policy premised on 
                                                        
4 Ibid., 228-229. 
5 Ibid., 130, 132. 
6 Ibid., 233-234. 
7 In more contemporary language, stimulus (autonomous macroeconomic policy) was 
constrained by the combination of fixed exchange rates and the free flow of capital, as described 
in the Mundell-Fleming trilemma. On this trilemma in the gold standard context, see Bordo and 
James 2013. For Polanyi's version, see Polanyi 1957, 229. 
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deflationary aims that could not be attained (and were destructive to the 
limited extent they were). Politically, the direct opposition between economic 
and political power meant an undermining of democracy. Only the demise of 
the gold standard could break the stalemate. 
 
With appropriate but remarkably limited modifications, this paper contends, 
Polanyi's arguments about the political and economic consequences of the 
gold standard offer powerful explanations of the course of the Eurozone 
crisis. That this should be so might well have surprised Polanyi himself. After 
all, the euro was not linked to gold standard nor even fixed to any external 
currency. At no point in the crisis was the prospect of a generalized flight 
from the euro remotely on the agenda. Moreover, Polanyi's account of the 
agenda motivating the bankers of the Great Depression era to deploy the 
panic weapon was comprehensively archaic by the early 21st century: parties 
of the mainstream left with not the slightest inclination to set the foundation-
stones of capitalism a-tremble simply could not provoke the kinds of anxiety 
among capitalists he diagnosed. 
 
Despite these important differences, two factors make Polanyi's analysis of 
the interwar crisis pertinent to the Eurozone. First, financial panic remains an 
endemic possibility under capitalism. A currency panic, in which investors 
race to sell a currency first amid fears over its exchange rate or convertibility 
into gold, is only one species of the more general phenomenon. As Eurozone 
sovereign borrowers and their creditors had repeated occasion to observe in 
2010-2012, any fungible, widely held asset such as a government bond is 
vulnerable to a panic if investors believe an imminent general shift in 
expectations of its value is probable. By itself, the absence of a gold standard 
does not ensure such panics will not take place. A fiat currency does, 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
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however, enable a central bank to deploy a powerful, indeed almost 
invincible weapon against panic: the use of money creation to buy up assets 
and coordinate investor expectations about prices. Most students of central 
banking consider this "lender of last resort" role to be a fundamental 
advantage of the institution.8  
 
But even without the constraint of the gold standard, last-resort lending does 
not take place on its own. The second reason Polanyi's theory proves relevant 
to the Eurozone crisis is that in its course politicians and technocrats were 
able to use the prospect of financial market panic for political leverage. The 
European Central Bank (ECB), as demonstrated below, repeatedly threatened 
to refuse to serve as a lender of last resort for government bonds unless 
certain policy prescriptions were met. These prescriptions aimed to promote 
the "Brussels-Frankfurt consensus," which substantially recapitulated the 
financial orthodoxy of the 1920s and 1930s in its support for austerity and 
promotion of the price mechanism.9 Because with the move to the euro 
national governments had no capacity of their own to serve as lender of last 
resort, they acceded to these demands. 
 
This new deadlock between social protection and panic-enforced fiscal 
orthodoxy had effects similar to its 1930s analogue. Economically, the 
Eurozone pursued an incoherent effort to at once induce deflation via 
austerity and to fend it off. Politically, what in Polanyi's case was a split 
between political power and economic power became, in the Eurozone case, a 
split between nationally organized political power and transnational 
economic power channeled by the ECB, again with severe consequences for 
democracy. Even the ECB's eventual acceptance of a lender-of-last-resort role 
                                                        
8 De Grauwe 2013. 
9 For a description, see Jones 2013 and below. 
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(in mid-2012) paralleled one path to the demise of the gold standard Polanyi 
described: it happened only after opposition to austerity had been politically 
neutralized, in this case via the drastic curtailment of the budgetary 
autonomy of national states. 
 
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. The first section sets out 
Polanyi's analysis of the economic background of the Great Depression, and 
of the role of "governing by panic" in the political deadlock that ensued. In the 
second section, I discuss some of the difficulties of making use of market 
panic as a form of political leverage, focusing on the strategic difficulties 
central banks face in credibly threatening to let a market panic rage in the 
absence of a gold standard. The third section examines the Eurozone crisis, 
describing both a protective reaction and the emergence of an austerity 
agenda enforced through panic. It suggests that the capacity of the ECB 
credibly to refuse to serve as lender of last resort depended crucially on the 
influence of Ordoliberalism on German policy makers and institutions, and 
discusses the political circumstances under which the ECB came to accept a 
lender-of-last-resort role. The conclusion situates the Polanyian explanation in 
relation to other approaches. 
 
 
I    The deadlock of the 1930s  
 
Polanyi's account of the political economy of the interwar period relies on two 
intersecting causal processes, which he summarizes as follows: "The one was 
given by the clash of the organizing principles of economic liberalism and 
social protection which led to a deep-seated institutional strain; the other by 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
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the conflict of classes which, interacting with the first, turned the crisis into a 
catastrophe."10 
 
However, in this formulation Polanyi mixes together multiple issues, and to 
get at the root causal mechanisms he postulates, some untangling will be 
necessary. Polanyi's account of the interwar years, I submit, is best 
understood as centering on the contradictory place of the gold standard. 
Policy and institutions ensured that the price-specie-flow adjustment 
mechanism central to the gold standard's economic rationale did not operate, 
but the gold standard was nevertheless maintained in many countries. In the 
context of this line of argument, the "economic liberalism" Polanyi mentions 
in the quote above effectively means the price-specie flow gold-standard 
adjustment mechanism, and "social protection" anything that interferes with 
it. The role of the "conflict of classes" was to block any coherent response to 
depression. Working-class influence in the political system blocked a 
deflationary response, but the strength of the "trading classes" in the 
economy, and in particular the threat of market panic, forestalled a 
stimulationist one. This protracted "deadlock" led to fascism, which was 
avoided only if the gold standard was abandoned before the collapse of 
democracy. 
 
At the core of this narrative is the "price-specie flow" gold standard 
adjustment mechanism initially articulated by Hume. It presumes a close 
connection between trade, money supply, and price formation. Prices at an 
uncompetitive level lead to a trade imbalance, which gives rise to gold 
outflows, a consequent decline in the money supply, and thence a fall in 
prices that restores competitiveness and the trade balance. 
                                                        
10 Polanyi 1957, 134. 
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However, Polanyi recognized a point also emphasized in more recent 
scholarship: this adjustment mechanism rarely, if ever, operated as described 
in practice.11 One reason for this, Polanyi argues, is that the institutions block 
falling prices. His discussion of the consequences of deflation is similar to that 
advanced by Keynes in the 1920s: in a context of falling prices, sales may fail 
to cover costs (such as labor) fixed by contract.12 As a result, protracted 
deflation would leave enterprises ("industrial, agricultural, or commercial")13 
"in danger of liquidation accompanied by the dissolution of productive 
organization and massive destruction of capital."14 In this context, a central 
bank capable of affecting the general price level through monetary policy 
prevents unnecessary and arbitrary damage.15 Central bank policy, though, is 
not the only barrier against falling prices. A second barrier applies specifically 
to the price of labor, where "social legislation, factory laws, unemployment 
insurance, and, above all, trade unions …[interfere] with the mobility of labor 
and the flexibility of wages."16 
 
Successful prevention of deflation in the context of a trade deficit means the 
gold-standard adjustment mechanism cannot operate. Since competitiveness 
is not restored, the trade deficit and associated gold drain persist.17 Polanyi 
notes two related responses. The first was trade protectionism, whether direct 
or via various forms of exchange restriction. The path from a fixed exchange 
rate to an overvalued currency to trade protectionism is a familiar one.18 
                                                        
11 Flanders 1993 
12 Keynes 2000, 36. 
13 Polanyi 1957, 131. 
14 Ibid., 192. 
15 Polanyi is especially concerned to show that the relevant destruction would not be creative, 
but indiscriminate, even if the necessity of deflation is conceded. For deflation could affect not 
only exporters and potential exporters, whose cost competitiveness determine the balance of 
trade, but also other firms "according to their fortuitous business dealings." Ibid., 194. 
16 Ibid., 177. 
17 For reasoning along these lines, see Ibid., 197,210,217; Polanyi 2002a, 124. 
18 Polanyi 1957, 27,214; Woodruff 2005. 
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Polanyi would have noted it as he followed Britain's currency crisis in the 
summer of 1931, for during this period Keynes was advocating a protective 
tariff to avoid abandoning the gold standard.19 Thus, "the incubus of self-
sufficiency haunted the steps taken in protection of the currency,"20 and this 
had cumulative effects in reducing international trade.21 The second response 
to blocked deflation Polanyi emphasizes is the spread of international credit, 
used to finance the balance of payments deficit.22 The joint result of these two 
responses was a waxing of international capital movements as international 
trade waned. "Payments, debts, and claims remained unaffected by the 
mounting barriers erected against the exchange of goods; the rapidly growing 
elasticity and catholicity of the international monetary mechanism was 
compensating, in a way, for the ever-contracting channels of world trade."23 
However, this "perpetual borrowing"24 was doomed to be temporary. 
Internationalized finance transmitted the effects of the U.S. stock market crash 
to the rest of the world, and international credit dried up.25 "The 
interdependent deficit economies went into an irreversible slide, and the 
whole stabilization structure collapsed."26 
 
Without credit available to cover the balance of payments deficits, national 
authorities faced a choice between deflation and exit from the gold standard. 
It was this set of circumstances, Polanyi argues, that led to a perilous political 
deadlock: in most nations, neither effective deflation nor exit from the gold 
standard proved politically feasible. The political character of his explanation 
                                                        
19 Skidelsky 1994, 293 
20 Polanyi 1957, 27 
21 For a similar contemporary position, see Eichengreen and Irwin 2010. 
22 Polanyi 1957, 206,232; Polanyi 2005, 351. 
23 Polanyi 1957, 206. 
24 Polanyi 2005, 351. 
25 Polanyi 1957, 233. For a recent account of this "sudden stop" see Accominotti and Eichengreen 
2013. 
26 Polanyi 2005, 351 
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bears some emphasis. The political vulnerability of deflationary policies in a 
democracy is clear enough. But Polanyi argues that abandoning gold to 
obviate deflation faces political difficulties as well. Certainly, these political 
difficulties alone do not explain the gold standard's persistence. Polanyi 
suggests that with the exception of the US and UK ("masters, not servants, of 
the currency"), leaving the gold standard "involved no less than dropping out 
of the world economy."27 He hints that international loans may also have 
bound countries to the gold standard, insofar as going off gold would have 
reduced the gold-denominated size of the domestic economy and made 
repayment of loans difficult.28 Finally, Polanyi also emphasized the powerful 
ideological sway of the gold standard, "the faith of the age."29 
 
Still, the importance of these factors should not obscure Polanyi's argument 
for the political resilience of the gold standard. Though this political argument 
can be detected in a number of points in TGT, it gets its fullest exposition 
Chapter 19, "Popular government and market economy." The argument needs 
to be understood in the frame of the above-mentioned "conflict between 
classes," in particular between labor and capitalists.30 For capitalists, the 
existence of the gold standard served an important political purpose. Though 
national currencies were backed by gold reserves, the coverage was not 100%. 
If a sufficient number of currency holders demand conversion of their notes 
into gold, convertibility would have to give way. Under the gold standard, 
then, currency was vulnerable to collapse in a panic. This circumstance, as 
Polanyi argues in the passages quoted at the outset of this paper, gave 
capitalists substantial political influence. When labor parties were in power--
                                                        
27 Polanyi 1957, 234,230. 
28 Ibid., 232. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
30 I am grouping under the term "capitalists" what Polanyi refers to as "trading classes," 
"employers," and the "financial market" more or less interchangeably. 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
 12 
as in Britain in 1929-1931 and France in 1936-1937, the prospect for capital 
flight (via conversion of currency) offered capital-holders a veto over radical 
measures. As long as labor was politically potent, Polanyi contends, 
capitalists insisted on the maintenance of the gold standard for political, not 
just economic reasons. 
 
Polanyi offers some hints as to why gold standard as a source of political 
leverage was so fundamentally important to capitalists: their fear that labor's 
political power represented an existential threat. This was not because a 
repetition of the Bolshevik revolution in Europe was in any regard likely.31 
Instead, capitalists feared that labor "might disregard the rules of the market 
which established freedom of contract and the sanctity of private property as 
absolutes." The consequences of this lack of what nowadays would be termed 
credible commitment to capitalism Polanyi describes in dire terms that would 
do any market liberal proud: moves along these lines "must have the most 
deleterious effects on society, discouraging investments, preventing the 
accumulation of capital, keeping wages on an unremunerative level, 
endangering the currency, undermining foreign credit, weakening confidence 
and paralyzing enterprise." This was the source of "latent fear which, at a 
crucial juncture, burst forth in the fascist panic."32 
 
The argument comes through more clearly when Polanyi's compact 
discussion of the French and British cases is fleshed out with the contextual 
details he assumed readers would have at their fingertips. In 1936, Polanyi 
writes, the socialist Blum took power in France "on condition that no embargo 
on gold exports be imposed."33 Blum's premiership relied on a coalition that 
                                                        
31 Ibid., 190. 
32 Ibid., 190. Compare also Ibid., 234-236. 
33 Ibid., 229. 
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also included the middle-class Radicals, who were opposed to capital 
controls.34 The explicitly political character of the capital control issue seems 
to have been widely understood at the time: many of those who transferred 
funds abroad from France even signed the relevant forms with Blum's name.35 
Although Blum did devalue the currency after coming into office, he 
maintained a tie to gold via a specified trading band. However, even this was 
abandoned shortly after Blum resigned in the summer of 1937 and a new 
government formed by the Radicals took power.36 This is the background to 
Polanyi's claim that "once labor had been made innocuous, the middle-class 
parties gave up the defense of the gold standard without further ado."37 
 
Polanyi asserts that this last statement applies to Britain as well, where he has 
in mind the fall of the Labour government (in August 1931) and the 
subsequent abandonment of sterling's tie to gold (in September). The 
proximate cause of the fall of the Labour government was negotiations over 
balancing the budget deficit, which had been swollen by unemployment 
support expenditures.38 Trade unions and many members of the government 
wished to accomplish this by raising taxes. Prime Minister MacDonald, as 
well as the Bank of England and the opposition parties, wanted to cut 
unemployment payments (the dole) instead. These discussions took place on 
the backdrop of strong speculation against sterling that left Britain in urgent 
need of international loans, which were solicited from New York bankers 
Morgan Grenfell on the basis of MacDonald's proposal. The bank replied that 
it could arrange a short-term loan only if the budget-cutting proposal could 
be expected to pass Parliament and if its announcement would reassure the 
                                                        
34 Gourevitch 1984, 125. 
35 oure 2002, 233. 
36 Ibid., 235. 
37 Polanyi 1957, 229 
38 For two detailed and careful histories on which I rely, see Williamson 1984; Morrison 
forthcoming. 
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City and the Bank of England. Told of this, Labour ministers who opposed 
MacDonald's proposal resigned, claiming that the government was cutting 
unemployment benefits at the insistence of bankers. MacDonald formed a 
new "national government" with the opposition and pushed unemployment 
cuts through Parliament. The incident became known as the "bankers' ramp" 
(with ramp being used in the obsolete sense of a market manipulation).39  
 
In TGT, Polanyi pointedly affirms the existence of the "ramp," but focuses on 
Labour's effort to maintain incompatible commitments to high social 
spending and the gold standard.40 An analytically parallel but much fuller 
account can be found in the journalism he wrote as these events were 
unfolding, in which he argued that "no immediate danger threatened the 
pound in August,"41 and traced the financial panic almost entirely to politics.42 
The purpose of the political deployment of market panic was to enforce the 
deflationary solution to the problem of international adjustment under the 
gold standard:  
 
[Chancellor of the Exchequer] Snowden and the City had resolved to 
reduce unemployment support and to improve the English balance of 
trade through a general reduction in wages and increased export. This 
was their long-range program for defending the pound's gold parity. 
In order to carry it through, the dangers threatening the pound needed 
to be painted on the wall as luridly as possible, in order that the 
stabilization of state finances—including, to be sure, curtailed 
                                                        
39 Ahamed 2009, 428. 
40 Polanyi 1957, 228. 
41 Polanyi 2002a, 125. This was a plausible conclusion from publicly available data, although 
policymakers had a different attitude; see Williamson 1984, 786. Nonetheless, different reactions 
to market difficulties were still possible, and in illuminating the path chosen Polanyi's analysis 
retains its force. 
42 Polanyi 2002a; Polanyi 2002b. 
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unemployment support—appeared as the only path to salvation. To 
impose this path on the country under the diktat of foreign bankers was 
the dominant political idea of the August situation.43 
 
That the conflict over the terms of the Morgan Grenfell loan brought down 
the Labour government illustrated, for Polanyi, the fundamental conflict 
between government by panic and democracy. Alternative measures to 
address the crisis acceptable to Labour's political base—maintaining 
unemployment payments while balancing the budget by higher taxes—were 
unacceptable to financiers, and the threat of capital flight gave the latter's 
preferences political weight. "The removal of the Labour Party from office 
was meant, like that of the French Cartel in 1926, to lend the pound new 
stability as guarantee against a capital flight driven by tax policy, which 
would have been a completely new phenomenon for England."44 
 
If in Britain and France financial markets dictated the scope of democratic 
governance, the U.S. case showed the opposite pattern. Polanyi argues that 
Roosevelt's decision to abandon the gold standard—which he appears to link 
to FDR's idiosyncratic economic views—was a crucial precondition for the 
success of the New Deal, as it accomplished "the political dispossession of 
Wall Street"45 insofar as Wall Street's power rested on the possibility of 
politically motivated capital flight. 
                                                        
43 Ibid., 137. For a somewhat less categorical version of the argument, see Polanyi 2002a, 124. 
44 Ibid., 126. This new stability was, of course, short-lived. In his journalism, Polanyi argued that 
Britain's leadership chose to break the tie to gold because they were reluctant to bear the costs of 
higher interest rates to the budget and private finance. Polanyi 2002b, 138. This is consistent 
with the position in TGT that Labour's political marginalization allowed capitalists to stop 
retaining the gold standard as a political weapon. For an account of the gold standard exit 
decision that stresses the political motivations of the Bank of England's leadership, see Morrison 
forthcoming. 
45 Polanyi 1957, 229. 
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Thus, Polanyi discusses two paths to the preservation of democracy in the 
interwar period, both of which require exit from the gold standard but rely on 
distinct political formulas. In one, exemplified by the British and French cases, 
the political power of labor is broken via successful financial market pressure 
on elected officials, giving capitalists the political comfort they needed to 
allow the surrender of the gold standard and with it the powerful threat of 
capital flight. (Polanyi doesn't rate the "democratic" character of the resulting 
system very highly, but formal democracy was preserved.) The other 
possibility was the pre-emptive abandonment of the gold standard by 
democratic politicians, as accomplished in the United States. Democracy and 
the market economy were rendered compatible a radical reduction in the 
influence of either labor or capital. 
 
When both labor and capital retained power, however, the result was 
"deadlock" and "a social catastrophe of the Continental type."46 Polanyi 
describes this catastrophe only in relatively general terms, with little 
discussion of concrete cases. However, he includes Brüning (German 
chancellor 1930-1932) among politicians who pursued a deflationary policy to 
protect the gold standard,47 and the German case clearly lies behind many of 
his more general descriptions. As Polanyi summarized, "in the course of these 
vain deflationary efforts free markets [were] not restored though free 
governments [were] sacrificed."48 Brüning's use of Presidential decree power 
to back deflationary policies would, for Polanyi, have been a clear instance of 
the "authoritarian interventionism" that "resulted in a decisive weakening of 
                                                        
46 Ibid., 229. 
47 Ibid., 228-229. 
48 Ibid., 233. 
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the democratic forces which might otherwise have averted the fascist 
catastrophe."49 
 
To sum up, then, Polanyi's view of the gold standard crisis: given the 
downward rigidity of prices, the gold standard ensured persistent trade 
imbalances. These imbalances could persist so long as international credit was 
forthcoming. But once credit became scarcer after the collapse of the U.S. 
stock-market boom, either the gold standard itself had to give way or prices 
in trade-deficit countries had to fall. The gold standard, though, was strong, 
for reasons both political—by amplifying the danger of financial panic, it 
served as a bulwark against socialist policies—and economic, as the basis of 
international economic integration. When for these political or economic 
reasons the gold standard endured, the austerity agenda needed to push 
down prices could only happen if the vociferous objections of labor were 




II    Political Use of Market Panic    
 
Polanyi's insights into the way the prospect of market panic can become a 
political weapon, I will argue below, shed a great deal of light on the course of 
the Eurozone crisis. Before turning to this argument, however, it is worth 
exploring in greater depth the preconditions for the 'weaponizing' of market 
panic and the circumstances in which these preconditions are likely to obtain. 
 
                                                        
49 Ibid., 234; Patch 1998, 181,201-213. 
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Financial panic is often straightforwardly and convincingly described as a 
coordination dilemma between owners of some liquid asset.50 If the asset 
owners maintain their holdings, the value of the asset remains stable. If they 
all try to sell it, the value sinks sharply. An asset holder who fears a general 
sell-off ought to try to sell first, but if all act on this logic they produce a price 
collapse as a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as some sort of binding general 
agreement between asset-holders is not possible, each asset holder must                                                                                                                                 
regard apprehensively any information that could induce other asset holders 
to sell.51 
 
That the prospect of financial panic stems from a lack of coordination among 
financial market participants indicates an ambiguity in Polanyi's claim that 
"the financial market governs by panic." Who, exactly, does the governing? 
An authoritative representative of asset holders tasked with ensuring their 
interests could presumably try to brake panic dynamics rather than pursue 
any sort of broader political agenda. There are two paths out of this analytical 
difficulty. One, on which Polanyi implicitly relies, is to suggest that asset 
holders have shared aversions to particular economic policies (such as 
taxation of the wealthy to fund unemployment insurance). Even without 
explicit coordination, they can be expected react in parallel ways to the 
prospect of the introduction of such policies, creating the preconditions for 
panic, which thereby becomes an effective political constraint.52 Whether this 
causal mechanism is plausible depends on concrete circumstances, but 
certainly it is not always the case that policy preferences among asset holders 
                                                        
50 For an example with currency as the relevant asset, see Oye 1985, 179-180. 
51 Keynes 1974, 155-156. 
52 For a discussion of the political power of businesses' non-coordinated action, though not in the 
context of panic, see Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, 79. 
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are always of a sufficiently general, coherent, and absolutist character for it to 
operate.53 
 
There is, however, a second means of political instrumentalization of market 
panic. An actor (such as a central bank) with the capacity to coordinate 
expectations—to fuel or calm panic fears—may also attempt to derive 
political leverage from this fact. This possibility is indeed illustrated by the 
British case that Polanyi analyzed. As the sustainability of sterling's peg to 
gold came into question in the summer of 1931, the Bank of England had the 
task of calming market fears by selling gold reserves, and arranging 
international lending to supplement these reserves. However, Bank 
leadership, especially Deputy Governor Ernest Harvey (who ran Bank policy 
during much of the period), were not reticent in impressing on politicians a 
particular interpretation of what would calm the markets or make foreign 
credit available, stressing budget balance above all.54 Eventually, Harvey shut 
down intra-Labour bargaining over how to deal with budget deficits by 
warning of an imminent exhaustion of gold reserves (while ruling out raising 
interest rates as an alternate way of preserving them), apparently deliberately 
seeking to bring about a government collapse.55 This had the effect of 
strengthening the hand of those who favored spending cuts rather than 
progressive tax rises as a means to balancing the budget.56 Even Harvey's final 
decision to abandon the gold standard was an effort to force the government 
to cancel an impending election he feared (incorrectly) that Labour would 
                                                        
53 To take a pertinent example, financial markets have not displayed a consistent attitude to 
austerity in the course of the Eurozone crisis; Blyth 2013, 3. 
54 Morrison forthcoming; Williamson 1984. 
55 Morrison forthcoming. 
56 On the struggle between these approaches, see Williamson 1984, 796-797. Williamson 
downplays Harvey's political maneuvering, arguing that although Harvey did tell MacDonald that 
unemployment insurance cuts were crucial to reassure markets, "MacDonald simply obtained the 
advice he wanted" (797). Yet even providing this advice formed a way of mobilizing the threat of 
panic to promote a particular political outcome. Morrison's evidence on Harvey's activities tends 
to contradict Williamson's view that Harvey held himself outside the political process. 
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win.57 This was very much an effort to "govern by panic," but an effort 
mediated through the specific institutional agency of the central bank. 
 
Looking at the US experience, Polanyi believed that abandonment of the gold 
standard should eliminate mobilization of the prospect of financial panic as a 
tool of political influence. Insofar as the course of the Eurozone crisis 
illustrates that he was mistaken (a claim supported below), it is worth 
exploring the grounds for such a belief. Polanyi does not particularly expand 
on them. However, was most concerned with a panic about the gold value of 
a currency, and under a fully floating currency with no gold tie such a panic is 
impossible. However, a currency panic is not the only sort of financial panic 
that might become politically relevant. The most Polanyi has to say on the 
subject of other panics, such as the bank runs with which he would have been 
intimately familiar, is that the gold standard might mandate "fatal monetary 
stringency in a panic."58 
 
Indeed, Minsky convincingly argues that capitalism will continually create 
the preconditions for panic. His argument, simplifying slightly, is that the 
search for an advantageous matching of liabilities and assets will tempt firms 
to use cheap short-term borrowing to finance longer-term investments.59 But 
such an approach relies on a speculative bet: that short-term liabilities coming 
due may be readily and affordably refinanced. During a boom, this is so, 
encouraging speculative borrowing. Thus, a stable financial configuration, 
where balance sheets are constructed such that current income from assets 
                                                        
57 Morrison forthcoming. 
58 Polanyi 1957, 138. 
59 Minsky 1977. Minsky provides a crucial supplement to Polanyi because of his much deeper 
exploration of the implications of the financial character of capitalism, emphasizing that capitalist 
economies are composed of entities with balance sheets, and that their ability to manage the 
relationship between assets and liabilities is crucial to their survival. While Polanyi demonstrates 
a clear understanding of this point in his account of the devastating implications of deflation for 
going concerns, he does not otherwise investigate it. Polanyi 1957, 192-193. 
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will allow the meeting of payment on liabilities, will regularly transform into 
a fragile one under the influence of straightforward incentives. This financial 
fragility exists because balance sheets become vulnerable to a change in credit 
market conditions (as opposed to product market conditions). Should credit 
conditions not permit refinancing, a debt deflation can ensue as firms 
liquidate assets to cover liabilities; the prospect of such a debt deflation can 
touch off panic.60 While regulatory limits on leverage (borrowing to fund 
investment) may help to slow the emergence of financial fragility, the 
incentives Minsky describes are powerful enough to fuel financial innovation 
that can get around regulation. 
 
Even if Polanyi had been convinced that the prospect of financial panic is 
endemic to capitalism, he might still have doubted the relevance of panic as a 
political weapon after the gold standard. Discussing the rise of self-regulating 
markets, Polanyi argues that capital-intensive industrial enterprise will be too 
risky to flourish unless factors of production (labor and the produce of land) 
are continually on sale.61 The drive to protect these two fictitious commodities 
is rooted in the vulnerability of society to their destruction. One could easily 
advance a parallel argument regarding credit. In a situation where Minsky's 
'speculative finance' is prevalent, the continued existence of productive 
enterprise depends on credit being on sale. Polanyi would not have had any 
particular reason to expect that the central bank, absent a gold constraint, 
would refuse to play a lender-of-last-resort role to preserve the availability of 
credit—after all, for Polanyi even under the gold standard, the central bank 
was an agent of the "protective countermove" that sought to avoid deflation.62 
 
                                                        
60 On debt deflation, see Fisher 1933. 
61 Polanyi 1957, 41-42. 
62 For a suggestive formulation with a Polanyian flavor, see DeLong 2008. 
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One can make a parallel case from the perspective of strategic interaction 
between central bankers and politicians.63 A central bank can use the prospect 
of market panic as a tool of political influence only if it can make a credible 
threat to allow the panic to happen.64 Under the gold standard, the credibility 
of this threat comes from the fact that the central bank can in fact lose a battle 
to avoid a flight from the currency (though even in these circumstances 
shrewd central bankers may seek to maximize their influence by concealing 
the panic-fighting capacities they do have available, as Harvey probably did). 
Without the gold standard, allowing a panic would seem to have 
consequences too extreme to make it a credible threat.65 That political 
deployment of the threat of market panic nonetheless became possible in the 
course of the Eurozone crisis is due to the emergence of a strategic substitute 
for the gold standard, as the next section will discuss. 
 
 
III    The deadlock of the 2010s  
 
The early 21st century plight of the Eurozone displays resonant parallels with 
Polanyi's description of the deadlock of the 1930s, but there are also 
significant differences. The economic prelude to the Eurozone crisis was a 
period of large intra-European trade imbalances. As in the 1920s, ample credit 
made these trade imbalances easy to fund. The analogy is not exact, though. 
Polanyi viewed international credit as disrupting the Humean self-adjusting 
mechanism the gold standard was designed to enable, slowing down relative 
price adjustment. In the Eurozone, international credit did not merely slow 
                                                        
63 For discussion of the interaction between independent central banks and politicians in a 
strategic context (though one where only the bank's own policy is the subject of contention), see 
Keefer and Stasavage 2003. 
64 On credible threats, Schelling 1960, 35-43 remains indispensable. 
65 For instance, on these grounds Posner and Vermeule 2009 argue that Congress must concede 
to the executive's wishes in the context of a financial panic. 
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price adjustment, but actually exacerbated price disparities. The introduction 
of the Euro meant that the European Central Bank set a single interest rate for 
all Eurozone countries. However, cross-country distinctions in inflation rates 
did not disappear. This meant that real interest rates were different in 
different Eurozone countries. In low-inflation countries real interest rates 
were high, while in high-inflation countries real interest rates were low. Thus, 
the Eurozone's single interest rate had a pro-cyclical character—delivering 
monetary stimulus to the higher inflation countries, and monetary restriction 
to the lower inflation in countries.66 Cross-country financial flows were one 
way these monetary effects worked themselves out. Credit flows thus not 
only compensated for trade imbalances, but actually drove relative price 
movements in a way that intensified, rather than relieving, these imbalances 
(see Figure 1).67 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative consumer price level (HICP) change since 2000 
Source: ECB 
                                                        
66 Hancké 2013, 94. 
67 Hopkin 2013, 141-142. 
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Germany was central to these developments. For low-inflation Germany, the 
Euro's introduction was recessionary, exacerbating an already difficult 
unemployment situation. Germany did not react to the recession by seeking 
to launch a program of domestic fiscal demand stimulus. This was more or 
less out of the question under the Maastricht criteria: even the action of 
automatic stabilizers meant that Germany was breaching these criteria by 
2003.68 Instead of stimulus, Germany reacted by initiating labor-market 
reforms (the Hartz IV and Agenda 2010 initiatives) that facilitated the creation 
of low-wage jobs. At the same time, those parts of German industry subject to 
collective bargaining began a long period of wage restraint. In a closed 
economy, policies to hold wages down have limitations as a growth strategy, 
insofar as wages are also the source of demand. But in an open economy, 
wage restraint's damping effect on domestic demand may be compensated for 
by export demand—assuming export markets are growing.69 But this was just 
the situation the pro-cyclical character of Eurozone monetary policy created: 
Germany's Eurozone trading partners were benefiting from substantial 
monetary stimulus, the magnitude of which grew with their inflation rates. 
Rising wages in parts of the Eurozone made the citizens more able to buy 
German exports, and at the same time made wage-earners less competitive 
compared to German ones. It is no surprise, then, that German exports surged 
and trade balances on the Eurozone periphery went sharply negative. Trade 
deficits were funded by lending from German banks recycling export 
earnings.70 
 
This pattern of international financing came to an abrupt halt in the autumn 
of 2008, but it was to have an important legacy thereafter. The run-up to the 
                                                        
68 Scharpf 2013, 2301. 
69 Ibid., 2304-2321. On the roots of wage restraint see Dustmann et al. 2014, 182 and passim. 
70 De Grauwe and Ji 2012b;De Grauwe 2013, 6-8. 
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Eurozone crisis saw the accumulation of multiple forms of Minskyian 
financial fragility fueled by international credit.71 Borrowers in trade-deficit 
countries, including the governments of those countries, came to rely on the 
continued availability of incoming financial flows. Banks on the other side of 
these transactions could thus only be assured of receiving expected 
repayments as long as general credit conditions remained easy. In the same 
period in two Eurozone countries, Ireland and Spain, a boom emerged in 
housing markets. Low Eurozone interest rates were probably a facilitating 
condition in kicking off the booms, though not a sole explanation (Portugal 
and Italy did not see similar booms). They were fueled by the classic 
Minskyian collateral appreciation-credit easing cycle, backstopped by the 
recycling of German export receipts. The resulting economic growth brought 
tax receipts, and the fiscal position of the two countries became much 
stronger—but also more fragile, in that the positive fiscal balance implicitly 
relied on the speculative finance that was fueling the housing booms.72 
 
From the crisis to a new deadlock 
Thus when the "elastic band snapped,"73 and international credit conditions 
tightened overnight, the financial fragility that had emerged over the course 
of the euro's first decade meant that the conditions for debt deflation and 
financial panic were very much in place. The effects of the financial crisis hit 
Europe in two stages. In the first, which began as early as 2007 but intensified 
massively after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the crucial 
issue was financial fragility in the banking sector. Some European banks had 
                                                        
71 For a convincing, clear, and concise statement of the intersection of the Eurozone's design with 
boom-bust cycles, see Ibid.6-11. 
72 Hay 2009, 463-468; Hopkin 2013, 149-150; Blyth 2013, 64-68. 
73 This is Polanyi's phrase to describe the sudden stop of international credit flows in 1929. 
Polanyi 2005, 351. 
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become heavily reliant on the US financial system both for liabilities and for 
assets, and the implosion of the markets for short-term credit and securitized 
sub-prime mortgages pressured both sides of their balance sheets and 
threatened their imminent financial ruin, which might well have led to a 
general collapse of the European financial system.74 There was no "fatal 
monetary stringency" in the face of this panic, though. The ECB made ample 
credit available.75 However, this dealt primarily with the liabilities side of 
balance sheets and had only a limited effect in stopping the collapse of asset 
values, whether of exotic mortgage-backed securities from the US or simply 
housing prices in Ireland and Spain. On this background, national 
governments across Europe took steps to bail out their banking sectors, such 
as Ireland's decision to offer a state guarantee of its banks’ liabilities.76 
 
Despite these measures, and parallel ones in other large markets like the US 
and UK, this first phase of the financial crisis was also accompanied by a huge 
fall-off in demand. Here, too, European governments were not passive. Late 
2008 and early 2009 saw a significant expansion in deficit spending, including 
the operation of automatic stabilizers and some explicit demand stimulus; 
Germany's demand stimulus package was the most significant, though 
perhaps the least advertised.77 
 
In broad, then, the Eurozone's initial reaction to the crisis was the sort of 
protective countermove that Polanyi would have expected. Rather than 
accepting the catastrophic consequences of letting labor, money, or risk find 
their price on an imploding market, fiscal and monetary policy sought to 
                                                        
74 Blyth 2013, 84-85 
75 See Irwin 2013, 280 for the beginning of this policy. 
76 Grossman and Woll 2014; Zimmermann 2012, 492-494; Zohlnhöfer 2011. 
77 Cameron 2012; Schelkle 2012; Vail 2014. 
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modify or reverse price pressures. Nonetheless, a second phase of the 
financial crisis began after the revelation of the extent of Greece's debt 
problem in late 2009. The hallmark of this new phase was a sudden and large 
jump in interest-rate differentials between Eurozone sovereign borrowers, 
with the so-called periphery (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy) 
paying dramatically higher rates.78 The financial fragility facing fiscal 
authorities became manifest as refinancing of sovereign debt in the market on 
acceptable terms became difficult or even impossible. Because interest 
payments were an important component of government spending, the danger 
of self-fulfilling market predictions of debt unsustainability (pessimism 
breeding higher interest rates breeding deeper pessimism) became 
significant.79 Meanwhile, weak sovereign debt prices created additional 
dangers for the financial system; holdings of peripheral debt were heavily 
concentrated in Germany and especially France.80  
 
Again, Eurozone authorities did not simply step aside and watch asset prices 
reach levels that would have bred financial collapse via rapid debt deflation 
and sovereign defaults in the face of market panic. From May 2010, the ECB 
expanded lending to banks and began intervening in sovereign debt markets 
to hold down interest rates.81 Concentrated in the peripheral countries where 
banks were facing the greatest difficulties, ECB lending served as an 
alternative source of financing for trade deficits in these countries, 
compensating for the "sudden stop" of private financing.82 Multilateral 
arrangements, worked out in a large number of Eurozone or broader EU 
summit meetings, provided fiscal support, including for banking rescues, in 
                                                        
78 De Grauwe and Ji 2012a, 866-867 
79 Ibid., 877-878. 
80 Thompson 2013, 7-8 
81 ECB Decides on Measures to Address Severe Tensions in Financial Markets. 
82 Accominotti and Eichengreen 2013. 
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Portugal, Ireland, and Greece.83 This international response greatly exceeded 
the limited multilateral interventions that had sought to shore up the gold-
standard system, and provided forms of support that had been all but absent 
in the earlier period.84 
 
It is thus possible to trace a protective response from the Eurozone that in 
many ways exceeds its interwar predecessor in vigor. It involved a sustained 
and largely successful effort to ward off outright deflation, backed with a 
significant degree of international coordination. But this response was 
nonetheless limited and riven with contradictions in ways remarkably 
analogous to those Polanyi describes. Like the gold standard, the euro had no 
adjustment mechanism for international trade imbalances other than 
deflation—the very deflation protective measures worked against. As 
domestic demand in the peripheral countries shrank or stagnated, reducing 
trade deficits via increased exports was a requisite of growth. But such an 
expansion was difficult to achieve. If trade deficit countries could not regain 
competitiveness via downward price adjustment, then the only way their 
price levels could sink relative to those of the trade surplus states was if the 
latter's prices rose more quickly. However, there were no policies in place to 
promote this. ECB policy pushed against outright deflation, but remained 
very far from promoting a level of inflation that would facilitate the 
emergence of substantial cross-country differentials in inflation rates (see 
Figure 1). Indeed, the leaders of Germany, with by far the largest intra-
European trade surplus, explicitly and repeatedly rejected this route to 
                                                        
83 See Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff 2013 for a survey. 
84 Accominotti and Eichengreen 2013. 
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rebalancing.85 By early 2014, only Ireland had seen any substantial adjustment 
of prices against the German benchmark.  
 
The protective countermove was also limited by intensive efforts—described 
further below—to ensure that assistance of all sort was conditional on 
implementation of liberalization and austerity measures intended to promote 
competitiveness by increasing price flexibility, especially for wages.86 Anti-
deflationary monetary policy was thus combined with pro-deflationary fiscal 
and reform policy. The broad pattern can be seen in Figure 2. While the trends 
vary somewhat by country, a turn from fiscal stimulus to austerity was taking 
place as early as 2010, somewhat compensated by expansive monetary policy.  
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Eurozone Budgets, Money Creation, and Unemployment 
Source: ECB 
 
                                                        
85 Bundesregierung | Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel Beim BDI-Tag der Deutschen 
Industrie 
86 Armingeon and Baccaro 2012; Blyth 2013. 
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Political roots of the new deadlock 
The Eurozone, in sum, was experiencing a reprise of the deadlock Polanyi 
described between deflationary and protective impulses. His theory of the 
political origins of this deadlock, especially the role of governing by panic in 
bringing about a policy stalemate, also proves to have great relevance. The 
key moving parts of Polanyi's causal mechanism find functional substitutes in 
the 2010s. The role of capitalist fear of labor radicalism was played by the 
neoliberal "Brussels-Frankfurt consensus,"87 strongly entrenched in the 
European Central Bank. By threatening to allow a self-sustaining market 
panic unless their conditions were met, ECB leaders were able to "weaponize" 
market panic to pursue their neoliberal agenda. This was possible because of 
a mechanism that provided a functional substitute for the gold standard in 
making such threats credible.88 This functional substitute stemmed from a 
combination of two factors. First, the institutional structure of the Eurozone 
was such that Germany held an effective veto over many measures needed to 
promote the protective reaction. Second, the prospect that this veto would be 
used was in turn rendered credible by the thorough embedding of 
Ordoliberalism, the particular German variant of neoliberalism, in Germany's 
institutions and policy-making culture. The strategic power of Ordoliberalism 
derived from the central role of rule-bound action in this policy approach.89 
Because Ordoliberalism offered resources to justify even catastrophic 
consequences in an individual case by citing the broader benefits of rules, 
actors with a commitment to Ordoliberalism could credibly threaten to veto 
policies required to ward off market panic. Both the Brussels-Frankfurt 
                                                        
87 Jones 2013. 
88 Under the gold standard, as argued above, such threats were credible because central bank 
intervention was necessarily limited in scale and could fail to stem a panic. 
89 On limiting discretion as a way of gaining a bargaining advantage, see Schelling 1960, 22-43. 
For a discussion of Eurozone reform as a chicken game in which inflexibility offers bargaining 
advantage, see Schimmelfennig 2014, 9-11. 
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consensus and Ordoliberalism have loomed large in a number of previous 
explanations of Eurozone crisis-fighting policy.90 The distinctive contribution 
of a Polanyian interpretation is to show how the prospect of market panic was 
crucial to establishing the influence of these two closely related sets of ideas. 
The Brussels-Frankfurt consensus can be compactly identified with 
attachment to stable money, sound finances, and efficient local-factor markets, 
especially labor markets.91 Ordoliberalism, while it encompasses these three 
elements as well, has additional commitments that require somewhat longer 
description. Ordoliberalism is a specific variant of neo-liberalism that 
emerged in Germany in the inter-war period and received canonical 
formulation in the post-WWII era, especially in the works of Walter Eucken 
and Franz Böhm.92 Like other market liberals, Ordoliberals extolled the role of 
the price system in coordinating economic action. And to make the price 
system work they advocated market competition: businesses and individuals 
struggling against one another to make sales to sovereign consumers. 
However—and the point is crucial to the entire Ordoliberal project—the 
economic system cannot be counted on spontaneously to evolve to ensure this 
outcome. Only state action will bring it about.93 Thus, compared to the 
Austro-American version of neoliberalism more familiar outside of Germany, 
Ordoliberalism offers a much more unambiguous and less conflicted embrace 
of the role of the state in giving order to a market economy.94  
 
Nonetheless, Ordoliberals, like other market liberals, sought to ensure that 
state powers necessary to underpin markets were not turned to purposes of 
which they did not approve. To this end, the economy should be governed by 
                                                        
90 Eg Jones 2013; Dullien and Guérot 2012; Blyth 2013, 140-141. 
91 This follows Jones 2013, who perceptively analyzes these elements, as well as their ambiguity. 
92 Gerber 1994, 28-32; Vanberg 2001, 37; Ptak 2009. 
93 Eucken 1982b, 270 
94 Blyth 2013, 57,151; Foucault 2008, 133; Ptak 2009, 1319. 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
 32 
an "economic constitution" which should ensure that the state's actions are 
constrained to take the form of general rules, an Ordnungspolitik or ordering 
policy.95 In this, the spirit of Ordoliberalism partakes of the continental or 
Roman approach to law (also known as civil law), which emphasizes the role 
of exhaustively codified rules and rejects the situational judgment 
characteristic of the common law approach.96 The mandate for Ordnungspolitik 
and pre-codified rules, like the proscription of case-by-case decision, were 
intended to limit the scope of action available to democratic governments, 
complicating efforts at rent-seeking by ruling out exceptions for particular 
situations, industries, or professions.97  
 
Ordoliberalism's legal philosophy did not enjoy unchallenged sway in post-
war West Germany. Ordoliberal theory had to compromise with a corporatist 
praxis it could not fully encompass nor defeat, a compromise encapsulated by 
the well-known "social market economy" formula.98 Nonetheless, its influence 
was far from negligible. For instance, a constitutional change was required 
before West Germany could begin a brief and limited experiment with 
contextually responsive demand stimulus in the late 1960s.99 Ordoliberal ideas 
had particular (though not exclusive) influence in shaping West Germany's 
negotiating approach to European Monetary Union, and had much to do with 
                                                        
95 Blyth 2013, 140; Gerber 1994, 46; Vanberg 2001, 39-42. Compare also Foucault's discussion of 
the importance of the "rule of law" to Ordoliberalism, Foucault 2008, 171. 
96 Cf. Gerber 1994, 47. For an outstanding discussion of the differences between civil law and 
common law, which emphasizes the fundamental importance of reacting to particular situations 
in the latter, see Curran 2001, 75. 
97 Vanberg 2001, 51; Ptak 2009, 1446-1469. 
98 Joerges 2013, 12; Joerges 2010, 396-398; Ptak 2009, 1340-1343; Manow 2001; Dyson 2001, 
138-145. 
99 Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Geschichte, Hinweise und Verweise Zu Artikel 
109); Tuchtfeldt 1982, 68; Allen 1989, 276-279; Dyson 2010, 296. It has been argued, however, 
that Ordoliberalism's strength in general lay more in West German private law than in public and 
constitutional law, the latter being more congenial to corporatism and the welfare state. Joerges 
2010, 397-398. 
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the rule-based character of the resulting Maastricht treaty.100 In 1993, a 
decision by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on a 
challenge to the Maastricht treaty had the effect of entrenching an Ordoliberal 
interpretation of its meaning.101 The decision defended the treaty against the 
claim that by denuding German voters of sovereignty it violated democratic 
principles by arguing, in the spirit of Ordoliberalism, that democratic 
governments were not well-suited to some aspects of economic 
management.102 The court further argued that the provisions of the treaty 
were sufficiently well-specified to grant European institutions determinate 
authority, any exceeding of which would require treaty modification and thus 
a new democratic imprimatur. In the meantime, the court declared, European 
decisions found to supersede treaty authorizations would not be binding on 
German institutions.103 
 
After the financial crisis, rules and institutions inspired by Ordoliberalism 
became entangled in a well-known dilemma. Strictly rule-bound behavior, it 
has long been recognized, runs the risk of producing perverse consequences 
in an individual case for which the rules are poorly suited. Ordoliberals do 
not seem to have grappled with the dilemma on this level of abstraction, but 
                                                        
100 Dyson and Featherstone 1999, 263,274-285 and passim. It bears noting, however, that some 
Ordoliberals felt that the treaty still left too much room for discretionary economic policy. See 
Sauter 1998, 46-56 for a summary. 
101 Joerges 2010, 403. 
102 Thus, in defending the creation of an independent European central bank, the court stated 
that such a measure takes account of the special characteristic (tested and proven--in scientific 
terms as well--in the German legal system) that an independent central bank is a better 
guarantee of the value of the currency, and thus of a generally sound economic basis for the 
state's budgetary policies and for private planning and transactions in the exercise of rights of 
economic freedom, than state bodies, which as regards their opportunities and means for action 
are essentially dependent on the supply and value of the currency, and rely on the short-term 
consent of political forces. To that extent the placing of monetary policy on an independent 
footing within the sovereign jurisdiction of an independent European Central Bank … satisfies the 
constitutional requirements under which a modification may be made to the principle of 
democracy. Bundesverfassungsgericht 2. Senat 1994 
103 Boom 1995. 
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their texts suggest they were "rule consequentialists."104 Rule consequentialists 
resolve the perverse consequences dilemma by arguing that the consistent 
operation of properly chosen rules will have beneficial consequences that 
outweigh any undesirable outcomes arising from the application of rules to a 
particular case. In a political economy context, such reasoning is regularly 
encountered in the discussion of soft budget constraints and moral hazard, 
analyzed in Ordoliberalism as the problem of proper assignment of liability to 
market actors. In these arguments, the attractions of mitigating some 
particular economic disaster have to be balanced against the broader 
consequences of allowing market participants to expect such mitigation, 
which can promote profligacy and excessive risk-taking.105 In the same vein, 
Eucken also makes a more general argument for "constancy in economic 
policy" to avoid discouraging long-term investment.106 The beneficial 
consequences of rule-bound action are asserted and the possible situational 
advantages of policy change (for instance, preserving existing long-term 
investments, as Polanyi suggests) are not discussed. 
 
Carried to an extreme, a consequentialist defense of a rule based on its general 
effect might be able to justify disregarding the unpleasant consequences of 
almost any individual application whatsoever.107 But this is not the only way a 
rule consequentialist might react to a difficult case. Another possibility is to 
combine an exception in the individual case with an effort to craft a system of 
rules ensuring that such difficult cases do not arise in the future. Foucault 
ascribes to Ordoliberalism two key elements, the first being its attachment to 
                                                        
104 Hooker 2011 
105 Eucken 1982a, 126-127; Eucken 2004, 280-285; Kornai 1986; Kydland and Prescott 1977. 
106 Eucken 1982a, 126-127. I have preferred to translated 'Konstanz' as 'constancy' rather than 
'consistency' given the flavor of the argument; Eucken 2004, 285-289. 
107 Hooker 2011 explains how rule consequentialists have addressed this issue by introducing a 
higher-order "prevent disaster" rule that overrides any other rule, while conceding vagueness in 
what counts as a disaster. 
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the rule of law. The second element is its "policy of society," which Foucault 
portrays as an effort to diffuse the capacity to compete in markets through 
society, ensuring that society will generate demands to restrict market 
competition.108 Conceiving of Ordoliberalism as a rule-consequentialist 
approach helps to understand the relationship between these two elements. 
The "policy of society" helps to ensure that that rigid rules implied by the 
Ordoliberal vision of the rule of law subordinated to markets will not give 
rise to intolerable consequences in practice. 
 
A brief consideration of Germany's domestic policy response to the financial 
crisis in 2007-2009 can illustrate the insights made possible by understanding 
Ordoliberalism as involving an ambition to a form of market-promoting 
governance bound by rules but that avoids disasters. Germany faced both a 
demand crisis and a financial crisis. It reacted to the first with extensive 
demand stimulus, and the second by a mixture of guarantees, subventions, 
and nationalizations. These reactions did not in the least reflect the 
application of pre-existing policy rules, but were rather extemporized and 
legitimated by highly context-specific legislation.109 In this light, it is tempting 
to see a gulf between Ordoliberal rhetoric and practical policies, with 
invocations of the former little more than a public-relations dodge.110 This 
                                                        
108 From the German Gesellschaftspolitik. It appears that the term was not necessarily generally 
employed in the sense that Foucault uses it, but I believe his argument is insightful nonetheless. 
Foucault 2008, 146,156n52,160. In a similar vein, Blyth Blyth 2013, 57 suggests that 
Ordoliberalism promotes "extra-economic institutions to allow labor to adjust skills to match 
market needs." 
109 Dyson 2010;Zimmermann 2012;Schelkle 2012;Vail 2014;Zohlnhöfer 2011;Kickert 2013. For 
instance, when a voluntary nationalization of a large troubled bank proved impossible, a new law 
was passed to permit expropriation in a very limited time window Zohlnhöfer 2011, 232. On the 
long-standing ordoliberal hostility to discretionary demand stimulus (though not welfare-state 
"automatic stabilizers") see Allen 1989; Tuchtfeldt 1982. 
110 Schelkle 2012 makes a strong case for this position. Winkler 2012 argues that Germany's 
successful fight with the financial crisis in 2009 ignored ordoliberal principles, while they 
dominate in German discussions of European problems. Vail 2014 also implicitly supports this 
case. He sees highly stimulative German domestic economic policy in this period as consistent 
with a tradition of "corporate liberalism" aimed at supporting favored social groups, but does not 
discuss the Ordoliberalism side of the social market compromise. 
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position, however, overlooks substantial changes in forward-looking rules 
that were bundled with contextual crisis-fighting measures. The most 
important of these was a constitutional "debt brake," sharply limiting federal 
budget deficits and banning provincial (Länder) governments from running 
deficits altogether.111 This constitutional change eliminated the reference to 
"overall economic equilibrium" as an aim of budget policy that had been 
introduced in the 1960s to authorize Keynesian policies.112 It ensured that 
demand stimulus would be limited in time, while also complicating explicit 
or implicit backstopping of the regional public banks (Landesbanken) by Länder 
governments. At the same time, aid to Landesbanken was conditioned on 
major restructuring.113 These institutional changes were, then, entirely in the 
spirit of Ordoliberalism, restructuring rules and the actors subject to them in 
ways designed to facilitate the operation of a market economy and make 
further discretionary interventions both unnecessary and unavailable.114 
 
Panic and the Protective Countermove 
It's now possible to analyze how Ordoliberalism intersected with European 
institutions and the prospect of market panic may to produce a deadlock 
between the protective countermove and austerity. Three crucial decision 
episodes—in April-May 2010, late summer through autumn 2011, and 
summer 2012—illustrate the relevant dynamic (see Figure 3). In each case, 
spiking interest rates on sovereign bond markets prompted a sense of crisis 
among European political leaders, who were well aware of the potentially 
                                                        
111 Renzsch 2010; Turner and Rowe 2013. 
112 Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Geschichte, Hinweise und Verweise Zu Artikel 
109); Tuchtfeldt 1982, 68. 
113 Dyson 2010, 403; Kickert 2013, 292. 
114 Compare Dyson 2010, 413. There is no space here to make a detailed case for the influence of 
Ordoliberalism on the decisions discussed; my purpose has been solely to show that these 
decisions do not offer a prima facie case for the irrelevance of Ordoliberalism. 
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disastrous impact on the banking system.115 And in each case, the ECB 
eventually used its power to create money to help calm markets. First, 
however, the ECB leadership implicitly or explicitly threatened to withhold 
its help unless policy or institutional changes implementing Brussels-
Frankfurt priorities (especially labor market liberalization and fiscal austerity) 
were adopted. These threats were made credible by the rigid rules on the 
ECB's independence and mandate, and the prospect of vigorous German 
political and legal opposition to exceeding that mandate.116  
 





                                                        
115 Thompson 2013 
116 In what follows, I do not offer references for facts easily verified from multiple public sources, 
but do seek to include detailed references for all potentially controversial assertions about 
empirical developments. 
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Episode 1: Enforcing Austerity, April-May 2010                                                                                                                                
After the revelation of the depth of Greece's budget problems in late 2009, 
European leaders debated whether and how to support the country 
throughout the spring of 2010. In the last week of April, with these 
discussions still uncompleted, a panic broke out on European sovereign bond 
markets in the aftermath of rating agency downgrades, with very large spikes 
in interest rates on Irish, Portuguese, and especially Greek debt, and 
noticeable spikes in rates for Spain and Italy. Falling bond prices raised major 
difficulties not only for the governments most directly affected, but also for 
banks, many of them French and German, which held these bonds as assets.117 
Given the serious prospect of a broader financial panic, in early May the 
leadership of the ECB took a contentious internal decision to use purchases of 
sovereign bonds to calm the markets. A second, simultaneous decision, 
though, was less contentious: to postpone announcement of the market 
intervention until after European leaders had created their own plan to 
address the bond crisis. The rationale for the delay, which was very explicitly 
advanced in the ECB's internal deliberations, was that were the ECB to act 
immediately it would remove the panic's pressure on Europe's leaders to 
come to an agreement on crisis measures of their own.118 
 
At a meeting with European heads of state on May 7, 2010, ECB President 
Jean-Claude Trichet described the bond-market panic in dire terms, 
advocating a rescue fund financed by European governments and a program 
of budget austerity.119 He also communicated that adoption of these measures 
                                                        
117 Anonymous 2010; Thompson 2013 
118 Irwin 2013, 3957-3959,4082-4093; Bastasin 2012, 200,202-203. 
119 Barber 2010; Irwin 2013, 3967-3971 
David M. Woodruff 
 
39   
was a precondition for ECB market intervention.120 The credibility of the 
implied threat that the ECB would sit on its hands if it did not get its way, 
despite a market situation Trichet had portrayed as desperate, was clearly 
tested during the ensuing discussion. Trichet flatly rejected the insistence of 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy and others that ECB begin intervention, 
affirming the bank's absolute independence of action.121 The evidence strongly 
suggests that institutionalized Ordoliberalism was an important reason that 
this intransigence could seem more than bluff. German prime minister Angela 
Merkel invoked the Maastricht treaty in Trichet's defense, and (albeit 
apparently in another context) mentioned the possibility that the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht would reject any actions inconsistent with the 
treaty.122 Two subsequent events illustrate how institutionalized 
Ordoliberalism—in particular, the shadow of the Bundesverfassungsgericht's 
Maastricht decision—meant the threat of ECB inaction might well have been 
viewed credibly. First, when the ECB did subsequently begin sovereign bond 
purchases the Bundesbank seriously considered refusing to implement the 
program on the grounds that it was not authorised by the relevant treaties.123 
Second, in 2014 the Bundesverfassungsgericht did indeed declare a later 
bond-market intervention program not authorised by treaty and thus at 
variance with the German constitution.124 At a minimum, Trichet's 
interlocutors in May 2010 would have had every reason to suppose that the 
he would face a severe challenge in winning internal ECB agreement to bond 
purchases, and that achieving policy changes congenial to the Brussels-
                                                        
120 This wasn't done in so many words but the message was clear. Ibid., 3976-3978; Bastasin 
2012, 208-209. 
121 Barber 2010; Bastasin 2012, 208; Irwin 2013, 3983. 
122 Barber 2010; Bastasin 2012, 208. 
123 Irwin 2013, 4124-4128. Recall that the Bunderverfassungsgericht had stated that decisions 
not authorized by the treaty would not be binding on German institutions. 
124 Lindseth 2014. 
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Frankfurt consensus that dominated within the Bank were necessary to 
overcome this challenge. 
 
In the event, Eurozone leaders categorically affirmed their commitment to 
budget austerity, and pledged to create (with help from the IMF) a rescue 
fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), to aid Greece and other 
distressed sovereign borrowers (with austerity conditionality a given). The 
ECB, in turn, launched direct bond market purchases to support prices and 
lower interest rates, and greatly widened its liquidity provision to the 
financial system in ways that served to ameliorate banks' losses on sovereign 
debt.125 It bears noting that there is no plausible chain of reasoning under 
which the effectiveness of either of these monetary policy interventions 
depended on austerity. Their bundling with austerity was the result of a 
deliberate political decision on the part of the ECB leadership. Trichet was not 
the only actor pushing for this result; this was also the preferred approach of 
the German and some other governments. Nonetheless, the negotiating 
history sketched above strongly suggests that the ECB played a pivotal role in 
bringing about this outcome. The ECB's monopoly on money creation meant 
it was able to offer something that the governments participating in the 
negotiations could not. 
 
Thus, in this episode, as in Britain in 1931, market panic facilitated central 
bank pressure on politicians for austerity policies. The most immediate effect 
was in Spain, where Prime Minister Jose Rodriguez Zapatero returned from 
the Brussels summit to announce sweeping new austerity measures, reversing 
a prior commitment to Keynesian stimulus.126 For Greece, Portugal, and 
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126 Aizpeolea 2010; Hardiman 2012. While the background to this decision is not described in a 
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Ireland market panic abated only briefly after the ECB's May intervention. 
The restrictive rules under which the EFSF was created meant that the EU, 
ECB, and IMF "Troika" administering its programs had an even more 
manifest capacity to credibly threaten to abandon countries to the market 
maelstrom unless its demands were accepted. The contradiction of this form 
of policy-making with democracy was pronounced.127 Both in Greece and in 
Portugal, EFSF programs were made conditional on pledges from parties not 
in government, to ensure that they could not be overturned by elections.128 In 
Ireland, the government party that agreed to the ESFS package was all but 
destroyed in a subsequent election, but absent alternative sources of funding 
the new government found itself equally constrained.129 
 
Episode 2: Disciplining Italy and Constitutionalizing Austerity, 
August-December 2011 
The pattern set by the Eurozone's responses of 2010 was reiterated in the latter 
half of 2011. The evidence indicates that ECB leaders not only threatened to 
allow bond market panic to rage if their preferred policies were not adopted, 
but also in fact did carry out this threat. 
Disciplining Spain and Italy  
From the summer of 2011, Spain and Italy began to experience spiking 
interest rates (see Figure 4). On August 5, Trichet sent letters to the Italian and 
                                                                                                                                                              
this, he would have faced a slew of negative commentary from the Commission representatives 
and perhaps other leaders, which would have roiled the market further; instead, he won broad 
praise. In any event, it had become in Brussels clear that the powers of the ECB to tame panic 
would not be put at the service of any government eschewing consolidation. Dellepiane-
Avellaneda 2014 concludes that Spain's shift to austerity was not due to ideological conversion, 
which is consistent with the idea that it resulted from coercion. 
127 Armingeon and Baccaro 2012, 3789. 
128 Ibid., 3475, 3564. 
129 Hardiman and Dellepiane 2012, 16-17. 
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Spanish governments describing what was needed to "restore the confidence 
of investors."130 Both letters called for intensified austerity, labor market 
reforms, and a liberalizing reorganization of collective bargaining. Although 
neither letter mentioned the prospect of further bond-market intervention 
from the ECB, it was clear even from immediate press reports that the letters 
were widely being understood as setting out preconditions for such 
intervention.131 In both cases, the governments responded with alacrity to the 
suggestions, quickly announcing efforts to implement the recommendations 
in their entirety, though without specifying their origins in detail. 
Figure 4: Bond Prices and ECB Intervention, 2011-2012 
Source: 10-year benchmark bond prices from Datastream; SMP purchases from ECB 
 
Intervention in the market for Spanish and Italian bonds began on Monday 
August 8. Although the ECB clearly intended to calm the markets, it was 
                                                        
130 Trichet and Draghi; Zapatero 2013. The letters were co-signed in both cases by the ECB 
representative from the country in question. Their exact content was not immediately made 
public. 
131 Blackstone 2011; Irwin 2013, 5657; Bastasin 2012, 299. 
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pursuing two contradictory goals. For investors seeking a new focal point, the 
predictability of ECB bond purchases would have facilitated coordination. 
However, predictable purchases—for instance, committing to a target interest 
rate for bonds by analogy with successful interventions into currency 
markets—would have made modulating interventions to discourage 
unwelcome policy developments impossible.132 In the event, the ECB did not 
take even minimal steps to offer a credible commitment to support bond 
prices.133 Facing a choice between mollifying markets and intimidating 
politicians, the ECB opted for the latter.134 This conclusion is supported not 
only by the ECB's public statements, but also by patterns of its bond 
purchases. (Figure 4 shows the volume of ECB purchases, which are available 
only as weekly totals and are not broken down by country.) For three weeks 
through October, the bank did little intervention, despite a sustained run-up 
in prices, during a period when Berlusconi's government was having trouble 
winning parliamentary accession to the measures announced in August.135 
When prices jumped in early November, interventions intensified but 
remained well below the volumes that had proved effective in the summer. It 
may be, as one observer believes, that the dip in purchases in the second week 
of November was intended to allow bond prices to reach levels ensuring 
Berlusconi's resignation, first promised on November 8.136 In any event, 
evidence is strong that domestic politicians who wished to install a technocrat 
congenial to the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus arranged Berlusconi's 
                                                        
132 Ibid., 328. 
133 De Grauwe 2011. 
134 See Trichet's response to a question on the ECB's potential role as a lender of last resort on 
bond markets in Barber and Atkins 2011 and a report of a recognition of the contradiction in 
letters to Sarkozy and Merkel in July 2011 Bastasin 2012, 292. 
135 Ibid., 318-319. 
136 Irwin 2013, 6174. In the immediate aftermath of Berlusconi's resignation, ECB board member 
Jens Weidmann claimed that bond buying was "not about helping Italy or penalising Italy." 
However, he added that it was important that bond buying not "mute the incentives that come 
from the market. Recent experience has shown that market interest rates do play a role in 
pushing governments towards reforms. You have seen that in the case of Italy quite clearly." 
Atkins and Sandbu 2011. 
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defenstration.137 And it is unarguably the case that the ECB leadership did not 
pursue bond market intervention aggressively when bond prices were at their 
highest level, and made clear its desire to deploy its resources only to support 
those governments that adopted its desired policies. Meanwhile, the 
resignation of another German ECB representative in September highlighted 
political conflict over even the limited bond-buying that was done, reinforcing 
the prospect that the ECB would indeed stand aside despite market panic if 
its demands were not meant.138  
Constitutionalizing austerity 
Through the same period, Eurozone leaders debated other issues as well, 
including how to reform and expand the EFSF. Germany's institutionalized 
Ordoliberalism again played an important role, especially in a struggle 
between France and Germany over potential alternate means by which the 
power of money creation could be harnessed to tame market panic. Sarkozy 
suggested that the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) that was to 
succeed the EFSF be given a bank license; this would allow it to borrow from 
the ECB. Germany resisted the proposal on the grounds that it would amount 
to monetary financing of governments. In September, the German 
Constitutional Court ruled that while German participation in the EFSF was 
legal, any further extension of German commitments required parliamentary 
approval.139 By late October, Sarkozy abandoned the bank license plan, ending 
his insistence the measure be included in an agreement that Merkel would 
have to take to the Bundestag.140 Sarkozy tried a different approach in early 
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November, proposing with US backing that the IMF use its money-creation 
powers to create Special Drawing Rights, some of which could be contributed 
to the EFSF via European countries. Again Germany objected; Merkel cited 
Germany's constitution in refusing to overrule the Bundesbank's objection to 
the plan.141 
 
Thus, the ECB maintained its autonomy to decide when and whether newly 
created money could be used against market panic. Mario Draghi, who took 
over as head of the ECB from November, publicly specified a precondition for 
intervention: adoption of a "fiscal compact" proposed by France and 
Germany.142 This would tighten budget deficit targets, and also require 
governments to give these targets a maximally constitutional character 
involving automatic correction, on the model of the German "debt brake." For 
the Germans, it represented "the extension of the ordoliberal paradigm … 
across the EU."143 Heads of government agreed on the outlines of the compact 
at a summit on 8-9 December. The compact itself made use of the threat of 
market panic as a disciplinary mechanism, since countries that did not ratify it 
would not be eligible for ESM support.144 As the leaders were meeting, Draghi 
announced plans for a massive expansion of cheap long-term loans to EU 
banks on 8 December. Banks could pledge sovereign bonds as collateral for 
these loans, of which nearly €500 billion were made at the end of December, 
allowing them to serve as an alternative to direct ECB bond purchases. 
                                                                                                                                                              
very low." Note that European leaders in the course of the crisis have taken decisions without 
domestic support; the credibility here is at least in part tied to institutional factors. 
141 Spiegel 2014. 
142 Irwin 2013, 6222-6232. For some evidence that the French and German governments 
conceived the fiscal compact as a way to convince the ECB to intervene more aggressively see 
Dams and Hildebrand 2011. 
143 Crespy and Schmidt 2014, 1095. 
144 Fabbrini 2013, 1019-1020. 
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Episode 3: A conditional end to panic 
As noted above, Polanyi argued that when the political leverage afforded by 
panic was no longer necessary, financiers and their political allies could 
abandon the gold standard. By the summer of 2012, advocates of the Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus had reached an analogous situation. The fiscal compact 
and other changes in European arrangements had sharply limited the 
autonomy of governments. Meanwhile, indirect support via lending to banks 
had proved insufficient to restrain a new spike in interest rates on Italian and 
Spanish bonds (see Figure 3). It was at this point that Draghi positioned the 
ECB to become a true lender of last resort for the sovereign bond market, 
pledging to deploy unlimited resources against speculators betting on the exit 
of any country from the Euro.  
 
The political context and significance of this decision are clearly revealed by 
the history of its development.145 Although the Open Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) program allowed for unlimited bond market intervention, this could 
only be done on behalf of countries that had agreed to a rescue program 
under the ESM and accepted the associated conditions. Defending the 
proposed plan to a German audience, ECB director Jorg Asmussen promised 
that it would be more effective than the preceding bond purchases precisely 
because it would involve tighter conditionality. "The failure with Italy in 
summer of last year, when the ECB bought Italian government bonds and the 
time was unfortunately not used for the necessary reforms, should not be 
repeated."146 This conditionality was key in winning the backing of German 
leaders for the plan.147 At the same time, Draghi noted that the plan was 
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directed "a 'bad equilibrium,' namely an equilibrium where you may have 
self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very 
adverse scenarios."148 Thus, OMT embodied a contradiction between creating 
certainty for markets (promised unlimited intervention to prevent self-
fulfilling expectations) and uncertainty for governments (threatened that 
intervention would end if conditions were not met). Nonetheless, the 
potentially unlimited character of OMT and Draghi's statement that bond 
markets could be driven not only by expected fiscal and economic 
developments but also "fear and irrationality" amounted to a significant new 
commitment to combat market panic.149 The introduction of the OMT was the 
moral equivalent of the end of the gold standard: an explicit rejection of the 
sovereignty of financial markets. The dramatic subsequent decline in 
Eurozone bond prices (see Figure 2) strongly suggests that bond purchasers 





At the end of 2013, economic output in the Eurozone was at 1.7% below its 
level in 2007, and expected by the ECB to exceed it by a miserly 1.2% only in 
2015. These lost eight years compared unfavorably even with the Great 
Depression. During this period, policy-makers used both fiscal and monetary 
policy instruments to ward off vicious circles of declining growth or financial 
implosion, yet did not turn these same instruments to promoting virtuous 
circles of expansion and avoid austerity. As late as 2014, Draghi found himself 
at once announcing deflation-fighting measures and defending deflation's 
                                                        
148 Draghi 2012a 
149 Draghi 2012b 
Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis 
 48 
necessity for adjustment.150 In short, there was a very deep intellectual 
incoherence at the core of the Eurozone's reaction to the crisis.  
 
The virtue of a Polanyian analysis is that it accounts for this paradoxical 
outcome, illuminating its political roots in the use of market panic as a tool to 
eliminate the space for democratic choice about economic policy. Despite the 
operation of institutions and attitudes reflective of Polanyi's protective 
countermove, the joint effect of the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus and German 
Ordoliberalism, politically empowered by the irreplaceable role of the central 
bank as a tool against market panic, was to push austerity and deflationary 
adjustment. "The market" did not demand these policies. (A particularly 
revealing incident in this regard occurred in early 2012, when the credit rating 
agency Standard & Poor's downgraded the bonds of a number of European 
states because of fears that austerity could become "self-defeating" due to the 
contraction of demand.)151 The collapse in Eurozone interest rates after the 
introduction of OMT decisively illustrated once again what had long been 
obvious: there was no direct connection between data on budget deficits and 
growth prospects and the mood of the markets. Eurozone debt as a share of 
GDP continued to grow even as interest rates plummeted. There is no sense in 
which the austerity agenda was imposed by market forces; it was a political 
choice that governing by panic was used to implement. 
                                                                                                                                      
Of the traditional explanatory triumvirate of ideas, and institutions, interests, 
this explanation emphasizes the first.152 If the thinking behind the Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus had been less deeply embedded in European institutions, 
if Ordoliberalism's rule-consequential style of thinking were less prevalent in 
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Germany, a deadlock could have been avoided and breakthrough to 
sustained stimulus would have been possible.  
 
Institutions were not irrelevant. Treaty provisions and the veto power 
Germany held over many potential actions at the European or Eurozone level 
contributed to the credibility of the ECB threat to stand aside in the face of 
market panic. However, these institutions only facilitated the pursuit of 
particular aims; they did not specify these aims. Flexibility was possible. The 
extensive creation of new treaty arrangements (such as the fiscal compact) in 
the course of the crisis, as well as the ECB mission creep involved in its 
detailed policy recommendations and adoption of a lender-of-last resort role, 
illustrate the potential flexibility of the rules. The possibilities for approving 
more extensive deficit spending created by treaty references to "structural" 
deficits could have been exploited to a much greater extent than they were.153 
There is no sense in which the austerity agenda was imposed by European or 
Eurozone institutions; it was a political choice. 
 
As for interests, this was certainly a case where they did not "come with an 
instruction sheet."154 Consider two of the relevant interests often cited. The 
politicians of creditor countries, such as Germany, could have focused on the 
benefits of stimulating demand for exports rather than on the costs of 
bailouts. And the taming of the bond market panic after 2012 suggests that the 
options for addressing financial-sector difficulties were certainly not limited 
to austerity. 
 
The reader will recall that Polanyi described three possible resolutions of the 
gold standard deadlock. Two preserved democracy while abandoning the 
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gold standard: the American "instinctive gesture of liberation"155 by FDR, and 
the British version subsequent to labor's sidelining. The limited and 
conditional way in which Europe has "gone off gold" by broadening the scope 
for ECB action may mean that the Eurozone will most closely resemble 
Polanyi's British case.  
 
However, there are also ominous echoes of Polanyi's third case, the 
continental outcome, when "economic liberals … in the service of deflationary 
policies, supported authoritarian interventionism, [which] merely resulted in 
a decisive weakening of the democratic forces which might otherwise have 
averted the fascist catastrophe."156 The rise of Golden Dawn in Greece and the 
unprecedented success of right-wing extremists in the European Parliament 
elections of 2014 suggest the continuing relevance of this analysis.  That these 
developments also underscore the enduring genius of The Great 
Transformation would have been cold comfort to Polanyi, as it is to those who 
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